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Guido Lenzi
The WEU between NATO and EU
I must mention from the start that I am not Mr WEU. The Institute of
WEU is in Paris, away from the bureaucratic influence of Brussels. That
should ensure our independence of thought. We are a think tank, a rese-
arch center where we try and think aloud about what could, should, and
may happen to Europe in the years ahead. We are researchers, not neces-
sarily finders. We bring up material, which we then discuss. That is the
reason why the Institute is not only a center for research, but also a mee-
ting place for people like all of you, who want to brainstorm ideas about
the European Security and the Defence Identity.
We thrive with the intellectual contributions of full members and non full
members of Western Europe Union. We can produce best to the extent
that we are recipients of thoughts and ideas produced everywhere. That is
why I hope that our two institutes can, together with others, establish a
working relationship.
That being said, the theme of my discussion today is „Western European
Union between NATO and EU“. What I will try to address and talk over
with you - since I have not made up my mind yet - is whether the Euro-
pean Union is energized or on the contrary stifled by these two organiza-
tions, after NATO’s Berlin and Madrid ministerials and the EU Amster-
dam Summit, both of which have indicated that Western European Union
is an instrument at their disposal. It is now clearly established, even if not
as clearly as we may have wished, that Western European Union is firmly
set in the sights or NATO and the European Union as a possible vehicle
for their future activities. Is this situation, of having two suitors, a reason
for optimism and encouragement or could it become a reason for discou-Guido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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ragement and passivity? In other words, is Western European Union
propped up by these two more comprehensive European organizations or
is it stuck in between them and less able to move than it would have been
otherwise?
Let me take one step back. I think we have to realize that security matters
are today quite different than they were during the Cold War years. We
are not talking only about territorial security, anymore. We are talking
also about cooperative security, i.e. putting military instruments at the
disposal of international solidarity cooperation and interposition. That is,
using them not to fight, but to prevent fighting and to engage in non-lethal
missions; which is something that the military (those who are among us
today know it well) are precisely trying to come to grips with. The nature
of security is changing. But also the relevance of security is different than
what it was, for public opinion. The public has been so far somewhat di-
stant from the decision-making process in security matters, which was a
prerogative of the executive in many of our countries, when there was
something looming out there that was dangerous or at least intimidating.
We were well aware for fifty years of what that was.
Nowadays, security issues are less cogent, less obvious. The man in the
street, the electorate, is less concerned about security. Precisely because
of that, he has to be involved as he has never been in security matters.
Defending territorial integrity and the Heimat is the self-evident responsi-
bility of every citizen. On the contrary, the interposition in the Great La-
kes, in Bosnia, in Algeria, in Albania is not a self-evident truth. It has to
be organized and explained to public opinion and parliaments; govern-
ments have to discuss it and demonstrate that it is feasible and worthwhi-
le. For politicians, policy-makers, those who assist them and the man in
the street, this is a completely different environment. That is why a sense
of fatigue may develop about engaging ourselves in external missions.
Algeria is in a great mess. Something must absolutely be done about it,
everybody says, but who will do it and how is not so clear. This is theGuido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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situation that we Europeans have to cope with: a new ball game, as they
say in the States. The rules are different and the players are different.
Now I submit to you that the Gordian knot that has to be untied slowly
(not cut, mind you, simply loosened) is the one involving European rela-
tions with the United States. This is a conundrum that has yet to be tack-
led. We have solved somehow our relationship with Russia, putting it on
a good footing. We have established meaningful relations with Central
and Eastern European candidates to economic, political, and military in-
tegration: I think they are less frantic about enlargement today than they
were a year ago. And yet, we have not addressed the shape, the mecha-
nics or the components of our new security relationship with the United
States. The main ingredient of every event in European affairs is the po-
sition that the United States take. What we have to reestablish clearly, in
the new international situation, is the scope of their presence in Europe
and how their relationship with the Europeans is going to hold. We all
know that the United States have always been the common denominator
for every European country. Even France, who played the lone ranger for
a while, has always known fully well that the American factor in Europe-
an matters was an essential stabilizing element. The Americans (as you
know so well in Germany) have even engineered German unification in
the presence of widespread European cold feet, here and there („too soon,
too fast; maybe we should talk about it and wait and see how it deve-
lops“). As you have experienced in your own households, German unifi-
cation was essentially the making of American reassurances towards Gor-
bachev.
NATO continues to take care of everything that moves in Europe, here,
there, and everywhere. NATO, of course, meaning also the Europeans,
but with an American preponderance in the decision-making and in the
military posture. After fifty years of it, we shy away from discussing a
possible new configuration of this relationship: we are not encouraged by
the US to do so, and we feel that we should first be able to indicate what
the alternative would be. I would argue, however, that it is not necessaryGuido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
6
to find new architectures for the transatlantic relationship. The important
thing is that this relationship be allowed to breathe more confidently on
both sides of the Atlantic.
The task that we have before us, paradoxically, is how to reconnect the
various European institutions dealing either directly or indirectly with se-
curity. How do we restructure NATO and the European Union, in order
to make them more flexible. We know that NATO itself is destructuring,
in the recognition that there could be circumstances when a cloning of
NATO, a smaller military coalition, may be detached from the fully inte-
grated structure and put at the disposal of this or that smaller combination
of allied countries, and possibly even of Western European Union. Thus,
the concept of making more flexible the structure of NATO has been ac-
cepted.
I even wonder if and to what extent the European Union itself could and
should destructure its three pillars, in order to allow for a more visible
and significant involvement of the candidate countries in the first and
third pillar, which they already are for many intents and purposes. The
third pillar is more communitarized than the second; the advances made
in the third pillar (concerning law enforcement and judicial matters) have
yet to be achieved in the second pillar. For CFSP purposes, would it be
possible to establish some clearly recognizable and institutionally well-
established relationship with the Central and Eastern European friends
before their economic criteria (3%, 60% and so forth) are met? Without,
of course losing the „acquis“. Preserving the „acquis“ while allowing for
flexibility is the crux of the discussion about European integration. How
much can we demultiply? It’s like a differential in a car, how much can
you allow one wheel to go faster and the other slower as you reach a
bump or a turn? I think the discussion in the European Union is and will
increasingly be in the future precisely about this restructuring.
There must therefore be, I feel, a combination between pragmatism and
institutional reform. Between the bottom-up process of doing things
among the able and willing at different speeds, and the indispensable top-Guido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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to-bottom institutional recognition providing the actions and initiatives of
individual countries acting together with different geometries, with the
necessary credibility, greater solidarity, and necessary legitimation. Legi-
timacy is an indispensable requirement for national actions in military and
security matters, nowadays. European countries do not go it alone, any
more: even France and Britain, who used to act unilaterally, loathe to do
so nowadays, most obviously. And even the reform of the defence posture
in the various countries, the national defence reviews, are undertaken in
order to allow national armed forces to operate multinationally, not neces-
sarily under the orders of WEU. An improved relationship will have to be
established between the ad-hockery which circumstances may require, and
the necessary international recognition and legitimization, which will dis-
miss any institutional syndrome: out of institutional conformity and more
into the business of doing things. Germany, for national reasons, has ta-
ken some time, but is now also coming around to this type of approach.
Let us address now some of the technicalities of what has happened. I
mentioned Madrid, Berlin and Amsterdam. Let us go further back to 1991
in Brussels, when NATO accepted that a separate (but not separable)
„European Security and Defence Identity“ could grow, provided that it
did so within NATO. There was some wavering about it, but finally even
the French accepted it. That is the way that we should now do it. NATO
went a bit further in 1996, with the Berlin decision that accepted the con-
cept of „Combined Joint Task Forces“. That concept has not yet been
turned into practical terms, which would allow Western European Union
to take care of CTJFs in certain circumstances.
Amsterdam may have been disappointing for those of us who wanted the
merger of two organizations, but I feel that we have nevertheless gotten
something more than we had achieved in Maastricht. The mechanisms of
the relationship between EU and WEU have been clearly established. We
have not acquired in Amsterdam an institutional relationship; on the other
hand, no  subordination  resulted  for  Western European  Union  in  legalGuido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
8
terms, only a possible functional relationship. The European Union has
established that if and when it thinks it could and should do something
that implies military instruments, it would turn to Western European Uni-
on to decide on its own. Western European Union is therefore not an exe-
cuting agency of the European Union. Western European Union, as it
stands presently after Amsterdam, will not take orders purely and simply
from the European Union. Of course, all of the ten members of the We-
stern European Union are at the same time members of the European
Union (and of NATO, for that matter). Inevitably, some kind of interlin-
kage will be established as the consultations in the decision-making
process develop. Once that the strategic direction is provided and the po-
litical directives indicated by the European Union, the Western European
Union will turn around and decide on the possibility of that operation and
the willingness of individual countries, the ten in particular, with others
also welcomed to join in. In other words, whether the proposed security
operation is feasible and whether national forces are available to be put
together. So a double decision-making process, in a functional relations-
hip, was established between two self-standing organizations.
In practice however, I feel, in this whole process with NATO asserting its
operational priorities (which have political implications, of course) and
EU asserting its role of provider of a political mandate, Western Europe-
an Union has been discouraged in practical terms from taking the initiati-
ve, from acting autonomously. WEU can still do so, legally. We all argue
that Western European Union can act either on behalf of NATO or on
behalf of the European Union. Western European Union is on record as
saying that it will even take a mandate directly from the OSCE or of
course from the United Nations, which in any case remains the supreme
mandating authority. But Western European Union can also go it alone
and decide autonomously. These are the possibilities, but I would argue
that Western European Union tucked in the embrace of EU and NATO
may be smothered in its ability to either act on its own or initiate a missi-
on in security matters either in NATO or in the European Union.Guido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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There is another thing I should mention. European Union and NATO
have in 1991 both gone political, NATO with a new strategic concept de-
ciding to go beyond Article 5 territorial defence; it was going political,
projecting security crisis prevention over the whole continent, engaging
itself in the enlargement process. European Union at the same time, in the
same weeks, in Maastricht also decided to go political. It decided to add a
political dimension, a second pillar to its first pillar economic integration.
These two organizations unknowingly, I would say, pretending that they
were acting in parallel, in actual fact started stepping on each other‘s toes.
This has gone on until Madrid and Amsterdam last year. After 6 years we
are again witnessing two processes elbowing each other out, i.e. a NATO
enlargement and a European Union enlargement. These are both very
well-meaning processes, but they are based on different parameters and
different perspectives.
Throughout all the things I said, the question emerges of how the Europe-
ans will get their act together with the Americans, now that an institutio-
nal triad has been formally established. NATO and Western European
Union have improved their relationship; so have the European Union and
Western European Union. Western European Union is thus ideally the
pivot, the hinge. What is still lacking is the relationship between NATO
and the European Union. Now, I put to you this question: do we really
think that this relationship can be established through the Western Euro-
pean Union? Or shouldn‘t a more clear broad-ranging consultative
process be directly established between the US and Europe, much beyond
what has been achieved so far by the Transatlantic Agenda. In security
and political matters, a link is missing between NATO and the European
Union, which the Americans have not been encouraging. We know that
the Americans do not want to be confronted with a European caucus, i.e.
a place where Europeans take their own decisions, and then go and put
them on the table, on the scales, as it were, of NATO. Moreover, the
Americans are afraid of the possible spillovers of a European operation.
They are afraid that if we go into Albania with European Union and We-
stern European Union flags flying, we will mess things up to the pointGuido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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where the Americans, meaning NATO, will have to come in and do the
cleaning up. We must admit that this attitude is justified, and not necessa-
rily ill-meaning.
These are the facts. The CJTF concept was conceded a year and a half
ago, but we have not gone much further than that. What has happened, as
you know, is a reduction in the number of NATO headquarters, but the
breaking-down of CJTFs has not yet been expressed. The Americans are
also doubling-up NATO‘s PfPs with a host of bilateral relations, not only
with the new-comers, but also with each one of us, the old timers of the
European Union, which may be good. We all feel very reassured about
all of this. But these new relationships must overcome the residual ambi-
guities and restraints that still linger in US-European and NATO- Europe-
an Union relations.
The second thing that has to be well understood is that NATO will always
be, in the foreseeable future, in the enforcement, conflict resolution side
of things, in combat-related operations. NATO remains indispensable,
because it has not only the assets and capabilities, but also the credibility
to do that. Whereas the European Union, because of its DNA, because of
its origin, is more into the humanitarian, civil-economic, crisis prevention
and post-conflict rehabilitation side of things. How do we establish this
sequence between the European Union going in to deal with the causes of
tension while, if things do not stop, NATO will have to intervene until,
once they have stopped, the European Union goes back in again? This is
exactly what has happened and is still happening in Bosnia. How do we
connect these different roles, without necessarily expecting that the Euro-
pean Union slips into the shoes of NATO and goes in to do things milita-
rily? We could do them operationally, at times, but we would not always
be politically credible, at least not yet. It is not because you wear a uni-
form and you carry a big gun that you are credible, if you are not tall
enough and you haven‘t been seen around the block.
CFSP is still in its infancy. Foreign and security policies, in themselves,
either nationally or internationally, are never a mathematical pre-Guido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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established mechanism. We cannot say what we would do, either natio-
nally or internationally, next time in Albania. What will be next time in
Albania? What will be the reaction of the international community, of
other countries, to the situation developing in the „next Albania“? So, the
next Albania will not be the same as the previous Albania. The Great La-
kes were never Albania. And Bosnia was never either Albania or the
Great Lakes. Each one of those tasks was different and will be different in
the future. Therefore (and Amsterdam states it) CFSP can only establish
the general principles, orientations, the common commitments, the prio-
rities that the Europeans share among themselves, but can never become a
clearly-cut, pre-established blueprint for action.
There is then the problem of leadership. I don‘t think we Europeans will
soon solve the problem of leadership, because we each want to be leaders
or, when we do not want to be leaders, we do not accept that someone
else becomes a leader. That is normal until a United States of Europe
emerges. Until then, for decision-making purposes, a leader will be reco-
gnized for individual circumstances. In Albania, the recognized leader
was Italy. But, as we increase the number of EU members, the problem
of qualified majority arises, and with it the the issues of constructive
abstention, enhanced cooperation, variable speeds and geometries. These
problems that do not demonstrate the weakness of the European Union;
on the contrary, they should push us to realize that we should act in such
differentiated ways, taking into consideration the contribution that others
can bring, and our relations with the United States within NATO.
As a final conclusion, I would say that Western European Union finds
itself at the intersection of the reform processes that the other two orga-
nizations are now going through. To the extent that NATO will downsize
its operations, with respect to actual circumstances as they occur, and the
European Union will upgrade its abilities, there will be a moment, which
will change according to the circumstances, where these two curves will
intersect. That critical spot will eventually occur. At that precise point,
Western European Union ought to find itself ready. We are acquiring theGuido Lenzi B The WEU between NATO and EU
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capabilities. Western European Union is not an abstract organization: it is
made up of the same countries which are in the European Union and in
NATO. It is just a matter of how we will organize ourselves in order to
go and get from the European Union and from NATO respectively the
political mandate and the operational assets that we need. We have to go
and get them, not wait for another organization to provide them to us.
WEU should constitute, as it were, the core group of security-minded Eu-
ropeans at the forefront of possible initiatives for NATO and EU to con-
sider, instead of waiting for them to take the lead in every circumstance.
We have with us at least one representative from a Central European
country. To the candidate countries I would say to remember that WEU
and the EU will develop to the extent that the newcomers, the newly-
converted will urge us to do things. It will not be easy for the old-timers
to come with new proposals. It is you who are the new European blood,
the ones in a hurry to do things. It is only if the newcomers will consider
supplementing their increasing relations with NATO with a European di-
mension, that a second leg will be provided to the CFSP progression. The
energy for European integration may in the end come from without rather
than from within. Once we have agreed amongst ourselves, we must go
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